RESEARCH

From ‘genius’ to AI: exploring the dimensions of creativity

Đorđe Lazarević [Author’s info]

10 December 2024 – Vol 2, Issue 4.

Is creativity a deliberate skill, a method of action, or is it an unpredictable and uncontrolled phenomenon arising spontaneously? This article outlines concepts of creativity spanning from the ‘genius’ to artificial intelligence.

Creativity has historically been perceived as a phenomenon that transcends deliberate human effort, often attributed to divine inspiration or a mystical occurrence. In ancient Greece, for instance, Plato (2003; 2007) characterized the creative ability of artists as originating from divine sources. Similarly, the ancient Greeks believed that scientific knowledge was not the result of human effort or learning but rather a gift bestowed by the gods. This perception of creativity as a ‘mysterious power’ continued to dominate thought well into the Romantic era of the late 18th century. Kant and Schopenhauer regarded creativity as a distinct characteristic of exceptional individuals—geniuses—whose works elude conventional rational understanding (Kant, 1987; Schopenhauer, 1969). While these gifted individuals were recognised as human rather than superhuman, they were believed to possess unique qualities that distinguished them from the rest.

‘Novelty’, by AI and Gil Dekel. 2024.

From mystical occurrence to systematic analysis

Under this traditional look, creativity is not understood as a deliberate skill or methodical action but as an occurrence—an event that happens to an individual, often seemingly arising spontaneously or ex nihilo. This perspective, however, began to shift in the 20th century with efforts to analyse and systematize the creative process. Henri Poincaré (1982, pp. 390–391), offered one of the earliest formal analyses of creativity, dividing it into four distinct stages:

1. Preparation – A deliberate and conscious effort to tackle a problem, which often culminates in frustration or failure.
2. Incubation – the individual continues to process the problem unconsciously, a process that may span days, weeks, or even months.
3. Illumination – the sudden emergence of a solution from unconscious processes into conscious awareness (Archimedes’ Eureka moment).
4. Verification – the final stage, where the proposed solution is rigorously tested against established methods or standards to ensure its validity. For example, a scientist might empirically validate a new theory, or an engineer may conduct structural simulations to confirm the feasibility of a design.

This framework provides a structured approach to understanding creativity, supported by anecdotal evidence. However, it appears more applicable to scientific creativity than to artistic or everyday creative endeavours. For instance, it is unclear whether painters or musicians perceive their artistic work as a method aimed at answering specific questions. Furthermore, the concept of “verification” is rarely relevant in the arts, where the term “evaluation” might better capture the process of assessing creative output.

From the mid-20th century onwards, psychological researchers such as Guilford (1967) began to investigate aspects of creativity, including the personality of creative individuals, the cognitive and neurological mechanisms underlying creative processes, and the motivational factors that drive them. Over time, psychology reached a general consensus, a so-called “standard definition” identifying creativity as “the ability to produce novel and valuable objects” (Paul & Stokes, 2023), and “the ability to produce work that is novel (i.e., original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful, applicable given the requirements of the task)” (Sternberg and Lubart, 1999, p. 3). These definitions provide two essential criteria for an object (the outcome of the creative process) to be deemed as creative: it must be both novel and valuable.

The pillars of creativity

However, creativity is not confined solely to its outputs; it also encompasses the processes and agents responsible for these outcomes. The term ‘creativity’ should encompass all three elements: the creative object, the creative process, and the creative agent.

1. The creative object

For an object to be considered creative, it must satisfy two fundamental criteria: novelty and value. Novelty requires that the object has not been created before. However, it is essential to distinguish between two types of novelty: novelty for the individual thinker and novelty for society or culture at large (Newell & Simon, 1962). Or, as Boden (2004) puts it: psychological creativity (P-creativity) and historical creativity (H-creativity).

• P-creativity – ideas or creations that are new and so novel to an individual but may have been previously conceived by others.
• H-creativity – ideas or creations that are not only novel to the individual but also entirely new creations in the context of human history. They were not created before.

For example, the independent development of calculus by both Newton and Leibniz is P-creativity for both thinkers, as the concept each developed was novel to each of them. However, assuming Newton’s discoveries occurred first, as some historians argue (Meli, 1993), his work would represent H-creativity, as it was the first of its kind; unprecedented in human history.

H-creativity is often regarded as more impressive because it involves producing something that has never been conceived before in the entirety of recorded human history. However, this raises questions about whether H-creativity depends solely on the act of creation or whether it requires societal recognition. For instance, if Newton had chosen to keep his calculus discoveries private, would they still qualify as historically novel? Boden argues that novelty is an objective property of the object itself, independent of cultural reception. Thus, Newton’s work would still be H-creative even without public recognition.

Despite its objectivity, novelty alone is insufficient for an object to be considered creative. While an idea or object might be new to an individual (P-creativity), it may still lack significance or utility. Novelty without value is arbitrary. A random sequence of numbers, for instance, may be novel but lacks value unless it serves a purpose (e.g., forming a secure code for a lock).

This raises the question of what distinguishes the value of creative objects from other types of value, such as economic or moral value. Importantly, the value of creative objects is often subjective, determined either by individual perspectives or through cultural appraisal.

Boden argues that works such as Newton’s calculus would retain their creative status even if they were not culturally acknowledged. Following on this, we might consider that value can emerge from a hypothetical evaluation under ideal conditions. This approach helps explain cases where historically creative works were not immediately recognised. For example, van Gogh’s paintings were largely ignored during his lifetime, and Nietzsche’s philosophical ideas were initially undervalued. Both men’s works were later recognised as creations of significance. By imagining these works evaluated without the biases of their time, their intrinsic value—and H-creative status—becomes evident.

The value of creative objects typically depends on the types of contributions they make:

• Intellectual value, such as that found in scientific or philosophical innovations, is assessed based on their ability to solve problems or provide meaningful insights.
• Aesthetic value, associated with art, arises from the unique impressions or experiences it evokes in observers.

2. The creative process

The creative process relies on various cognitive functions, including association, analogy, metacognition, and self-reflection. These functions enable making connections between existing knowledge and new insights, often resulting in novel outputs. Contrary to popular belief, logical reasoning also plays a role in creativity. Logic is not an antithesis but a complementary tool for clarifying or refining ideas. However, logical reasoning alone is rarely sufficient for creative endeavour. Beyond these specific cognitive functions, creativity generally integrates emotions, perception, memory, and critical reflection.

The creative process is characterised by unpredictability and resistance to rigid mechanisation. Maria Kronfeldner (2009, p. 588) identifies spontaneity as a key feature of creativity, which can manifest in two distinct ways:

1. Absence of predictable outcomes: in many creative endeavours, the final outcome is not anticipated at the outset. For example, Agatha Christie reportedly wrote several of her crime novels without knowing the identity of the culprit until the later stages of her writing process.
2. Non-mechanical routines: creative processes often involve methods that cannot be reduced to repeatable or algorithmic procedures. For instance, Georges Seurat’s pointillist painting technique was likely developed through experimentation and trial-and-error rather than by following a predetermined formula.

Although spontaneity implies freedom from rigid methods, it does not equate to randomness. Random acts lack intent and purpose, whereas creative spontaneity is guided by intent and exploratory focus. For example, a decorator working on decorating a house might test their roller on a wall to check paint absorption before they paint the whole wall. This might produce an image similar to that of an abstract artist. However, the decorator’s work would not be considered creative, as it lacks thought or planning, whereas the artist’s work might, provided it can be recognised as valuable.

Spontaneity is a defining characteristic of all creative processes. Additionally, Boden (2004) provides another categorisation of creative processes:

1. Composite creativity – combining existing elements in novel ways. Examples include poetic metaphors or Rutherford’s atomic model.
2. Exploratory Creativity – discovering new possibilities within an established conceptual set of rules, such as innovations in quantum physics or the development of baroque art.
3. Transformational creativity – redefining or breaking the boundaries of conceptual space, as exemplified by Copernicus’s heliocentric theory or Schoenberg’s atonal music, both of which challenged existing paradigms.

3. The creative agent

A creative agent is the person or entity responsible for the production of creative objects. The standard definition of creativity—as the ability to produce novel and valuable objects—implies that creativity is a capacity or capability. However, creativity as a capability is best understood as a disposition rather than merely a skill. A disposition reflects an enduring tendency to act in particular ways under certain conditions. For instance, individuals who consistently demonstrate originality and value in their outputs are considered creative. As Gaut (2018, p. 124) observes, creativity is not merely a potential ability; it must be evidenced through actual results.

A creative agent is characterised by the following attributes:

1. Consciousness and intentionality – a creative agent must be a conscious being with subjective experiences. Their mental states must relate to the world, enabling representations—whether in language, images, or other forms—that are meaningful about the world. Additionally, the agent must understand the relationship between their mental states and the external reality.
2. Skills and knowledge – creative agents require expertise or mastery in their respective fields. This encompasses technical proficiency, which may be acquired through learning or innate aptitude. Skills and knowledge provide the foundational tools necessary for creative production.
3. Motivation – an intrinsic and genuine passion for the task itself—rather than external rewards or incentives. This motivation excludes random occurrences from being classified as creative acts, as creativity necessitates intention and purpose.
4. Reflection and evaluation – the capacity to assess one’s work. Creative agents must recognise their outputs and refine them as needed, ensuring their work meets both novel and valuable criteria.

Relative independence

The integration of the creative object, process, and agent holds relative independence. Once created, a creative object exists independently of the process or agent that produced it. Its novelty and value are intrinsic properties, though their evaluation often depends on cultural and historical contexts. For example, a painting or a scientific theory can be judged to be creative based on its intrinsic qualities, regardless of how it was made or who made it.

The creative object, after its creation, becomes independent of the agent or process, but the agent or process is judged creative because they caused that object to come into being.

This principle applies not only to extraordinary achievements but also to everyday creative acts. For example, crafting a witty joke, formulating a unique explanation, or inventing a new recipe can demonstrate creativity. A comedian writing an original punchline or a teacher presenting an innovative explanation is as much a participant in the creative process as a painter or a scientist. Thus, while the processes and agents must exhibit key qualities of intention, expertise, and intrinsic motivation, they are deemed creative primarily due to their causal connection to the resulting creative objects.

In light of these considerations, creativity can be defined as the disposition of a conscious agent that produces novel and valuable objects through processes that combine intention, spontaneity, and skill.

AI

Artificial intelligence introduces new possibilities for generating ideas and creative outputs, prompting debate about its role in creativity.

While AI-generated art or theories may exhibit novelty and value, their status as genuinely creative remains debated. Boden (2014) argues that creativity requires intentionality and emotional engagement, attributes that current AI systems fundamentally lack. Without subjective experiences or the capacity for reflection, AI-generated works, no matter how impressive, are often dismissed as algorithmic artefacts rather than creative expressions.

While human creativity often thrives on unpredictability and serendipity, AI systems operate within the constraints of their programming and training data. McDonough (1994) argues that this deterministic foundation denies true spontaneity. Yet, Turing (1950) suggests that AI systems exhibit a form of computational spontaneity through emergent behaviours and unanticipated solutions within defined parameters.

The philosophical inquiry into creativity must consider whether AI can evolve into a creative agent. Current AI technology lacks consciousness and intrinsic motivation. However, if AI systems were to develop features akin to those of human creative agents—such as intentionality—it is conceivable that they could be recognised as creative. This depends on AI achieving neural structures and cognitive processes analogous to those of human creators. If AI could develop features akin to human creative agents, it might demonstrate intentionality, self-reflection, and a capacity for evaluation, which are foundational to creativity.

At a Glance:

Creativity = Agent (consciousness) + Process (intention, spontaneity, skill) → Object (novelty, value).

Creativity is the disposition of a conscious agent that produces novel and valuable objects through processes that combine intention, spontaneity, and skill.

© Journal of Creativity and Inspiration.

About the author

Đorđe Lazarević is a PhD student in Philosophy at University of Belgrade, writing a dissertation on the question of metaphysical and epistemological foundations of integrative relationship between creativity and artificial intelligence. He holds an MA in Philosophy from the University of Belgrade, as well as a Bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from the University of Niš. His interests include philosophy of technology, metaphysics of time, education and history of philosophy.

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